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Hull: Consumer Protection: A Misallocation of Protection
[Vol. XXV

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

CONSUMER PROTECTION: A MISALLOCATION OF
PROTECTION
The rapid increase in the use of consumer credit since 1950' necessitates
a critical examination of the consumer credit triangle of merchandise-seller,
consumer-buyer,2 and financial institution.3 Preserving consumer defenses as
4
against third party financial institutions has become an important concern,
the seriousness of which may be appreciated by reference to the issues raised
in the following fact situation. 5
A consumer-buyer is approached by a merchant-seller and offered a free
freezer in exchange for the promise to purchase seventy dollars worth of food
per month for three years. Enticed by these representations, the consumer
executes a conditional sales contract containing a waiver of defense clause6
and a promissory note, the terms of which are to be filled in later. The forms
are prepared and supplied to the seller by a financial institution. The reverse
side of the conditional sales contract contains a statement of the consumer's
financial condition, which is used to secure credit from the financial institution for the transaction. When the consumer receives his copy of the conditional sales contract the incredible bargain has become a costly commitment
because of the high cost of the food. The consumer therefore refuses to make
any payment to the financial institution, which has been negotiated the
note and assigned the retail installment contract. The financial institution,
asserting it is a holder in due course 7 brings suit for the balance due on the
consumer's note. Against a holder in due course the consumer is precluded
from asserting the personal defenses" of fraud in the inducement and failure

1. Total consumer credit has more than doubled every ten years since 1939: 1939 $7,222,000,000; 1950-$12,471,000,000; 1966-$56,141,000,000; 1971 (end of July)-$128,354,000,000. 57 FED. RESERVE BULL. A56 (1971).
2. A "consumer" for the purpose of this note is defined as "a person other than an
organization who seeks or acquires business equipment for use in his business, or real or
personal property, services, money or credit for personal, family, household or agricultural

purposes."

NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT

§1.301 (8) (First Final Draft) [hereinafter cited as NCA].

3. The terms "finance company" and "financial institution" are synonymous as used
in this note. The terms include commercial banks and sales finance companies.
4. See Consumer Credit and Shoddy Goods, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Oct. 4, 1971,
at 59.
5. This fact situation is based substantially on Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J.
Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969).
"The Buyer will settle all claims against the named seller (the assignor) directly with such
seller and will not assert or use as a defense any such claim against the assignee." Id. at
548, 264 A.2d at 549.

7. The

UNIFORM COMMSERCIAL CODE

§3-302(1)(a)-(c) [hereinafter cited as UCC] pro-

vides: "(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value;
and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
8. UCC §3-305 provides in part: "To the extent that a holder is a holder in due
course he takes the instrument free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person;
and (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
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of consideration.9 Alternatively, the consumer may be precluded from asserting
certain defenses because of the waiver of defense clause contained in the
conditional sales contract. 0 In either instance the consumer is compelled to
pay the financial institution, his only remedy being redress from the seller
who often has become insolvent or has absconded. Thus, in many instances
the consumer is left without an adequate remedy.
The purpose of this note is to explore the changes needed in the law
governing consumer credit transactions. The policies underlying the holder
in due course doctrine and waiver of defense clauses will be considered with
regard to their applicability to the realities of the consumer credit transaction.
The judicial response to the problems created by the application of the
holder in due course doctrine and waiver of defense clauses to consumer credit
transactions will also be examined and finally, various legislative alternatives
and proposals designed to preserve the consumer's defenses will be presented.
FREE

NEGOTIABILITY

AS THE UNDERLYING POLICY
IN DUE COURSE" DOCTRINE

OF THE

"HOLDER

In the early nineteenth century, today's easy credit terms were not
available.-' Credit transactions, being almost exclusively commercial, were
2
entered into between parties of relatively equal bargaining power. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the common law developed strongly favoring
the creditor and encouraging the negotiability of commercial paper.' 3 These
policies were effectuated by the holder in due course doctrine. This doctrine
held that a good faith purchaser' 4 of a negotiable instrument took it clear
of the personal defenses of the maker.'1 The standard of good faith required
except (a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract, and (b) such
other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation of
the party a nullity; and (c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and ...."
9. UCC §3-306 provides in part: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course
any person takes the instrument subject to (a) all valid claims to it on the part of any
person; and (b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a
simple contract; and (c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance
of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose . . . :"
10. Although the general rule is that an assignee takes subject to the defenses of the
obligor against the assignor the assignee may take subject to no defenses of the obligor
if there is a waiver of defense clause. 4 A. CoRBIN CONTR ars §§892, 899 (1951).
11. See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. Riv.
387, 433 (1968).
12. Id.

13. Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B. 1801).
14. For the necessary requirements to qualify as a holder in due course under the
UCO see note 7, supra.

15. See Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 57, 170 Eng. Rep. 640, 641 (K.B. 1801). Defenses
to actions in negotiable instruments are either real or personal. Real defenses exist when
the instrument sued upon never had any legal effect such as in the case of a forged
instrument or one that has been materially altered. Personal defenses such as failure of
consideration assert that the obligation expressed by the note is voidable due to some
subsequent act by the original parties to the note. W, IJAWIJLAND1 COMMERCIAL PAPER (1959).
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at common law to attain the status of holder in due course was subjective 6
rather than objective.17 Furthermore, inquiry into the transaction from
which the note arose was not required even if a prudent man would suspect
the maker had personal defenses arising from the transaction.'

s

Thus, only

actual knowledge of a notemaker's personal defenses would preclude holder
in due course status.
The courts in the United States generally followed the common law rule,
requiring actual knowledge to defeat an assertion of good faith acquisition
of commercial paper.19 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act (UNIA)
adopted by all the states,20 incorporated the language of the common law
in defining a holder in due course,2 1 and thereby created the assumption that
22
the test of good faith required under the act was the subjective test. The

subjective test embraced by the UNIA furthered the policy of free negotia23
bility of commercial paper, which was a necessity in the business community.
16. See Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836).
17. Both the subjective and objective tests concern themselves with the holder's state
of mind. The subjective test is also known as the "white heart" test. The question asked
is: "What did the holder 'actually know' of the transaction underlying the negotiable
instrument?" The objective test is also known as the "prudent man" test. The question
asked is: "What would the holder have known of the underlying transaction had he been
as alert as he should have been?" Johnston, Unico v. Owen - Judicial Mastery of the
"Hard Case," 24 RUTGERs L. REV. 500, 503 (1970).
18. The subjective test was criticized in Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep.
806 (K.B. 1824), as encouraging theft or fraud. The court held that the verdict should
be in favor of the maker of a note in a suit brought by the holder, if the holder took the
note under circumstances that ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent and careful man. In a later case, Crook v. Jadis, B. & Ad. 909, 110 Eng. Rep. 1028 (K.B. 1834), it
was held that gross negligence instead of a prudent man standard was necessary to preclude a holder from becoming a holder in due course. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870,
111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836), settled the matter for the common law. Goodman held
that gross negligence was evidence of lack of good faith, but not its equivalent. Although
this holding reinstated the subjective test of good faith for the common law, the legal
controversy that began in Gill v. Cubitt has continued to affect decisions and statutes pertaining to the rights of holders of negotiable instruments. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text infra.
19. The United States Supreme Court expressly stated that knowledge of the facts
was essential for a finding of lack of good faith. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343 (1857).
Contra, Mee v. Carlson, 22 S.D. 365, 117 N.W. 1033 (1908). "[I]f he fails to show that he
purchased the note in good faith . . . where circumstances attending the purchase are
calculated to excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinarily prudent man, the law will not
id.
i" at 376-77, 117 N.W. at 1037.
protect him ..
20. 5 UNIFORM LAws ANNOT. at v (1943).
21. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Ac §52 [hereinafter cited as UNIA] provides:
"A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions: (1) that it is complete and regular upon its face, (2) that he became the
holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact, (3) that he took it in good faith and for value, (4) that at
the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or
defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
22. See generally Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure
of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966).
23. Courts continually stress the importance of free negotiability of commercial paper
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WAIVER CLAUSES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NEGOTIABILITY

A second means by which the consumer is precluded from asserting personal defenses against third parties is by the inclusion of waiver of defense
clauses in conditional sales contracts. Typically, a purchaser will agree not
to assert any defenses he may have against the seller in any suit on the contract by the seller's assignee. Since the assignee enjoys the protection afforded
a holder in due course, the use of waiver of defense clauses amounts to ne24

gotiability by contract.
The provisions of the UNIA relating to the requirements for negotiability
did not preclude negotiability by contract. 25 The parties, however, had to
show the clear intention to make the contract negotiable even though it did
not conform to the concept of negotiability as provided in the UNIA.26
Negotiability by contract through the use of waiver clauses was obviously
advantageous to the seller, since third party protection from the obligor's
defenses greatly facilitated the transfer of the contract for value. Judicial
treatment of waiver clauses has varied historically from upholding their
2
validity27 to declaring them void as against public policy. 8
THE DESIRABILITY OF SHIFTING THE RISK OF Loss FROM THE CONSUMER
TO THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION

Consumer credit financing could appropriately be called an industry. With
the number of consumers buying on credit increasing yearly, a community
of interests has arisen between sellers of consumer goods and financial institutions. -9 The functions of the financial institution are to purchase the con-

sumer paper from the seller and to finance the seller's inventory purchases.8 0

and that the business community relies upon it for financing. E.g., Calvert Credit Corp. v.
Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (1968); Baraban v. Manatee Nat1 Bank of Bradenton, 212 So. 2d
341 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1968).
24. "It was, therefore, manifest upon the face of this instrument that it was the
intention of the parties that it should be negotiated, and they made that intention a part
of their contract." Howie v. Lewis, 14 Pa. Sup. Ct. 232, 239 (1900).
25. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. Rv. 205 (1933).
26. Id. at 213.
27. E.g., Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908 (1937);
National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicates, 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1939); Howie v.
Lewis, 14 Pa. Sup. Ct. 232 (1900); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211

P. 991 (1922).
28. E.g., San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 P. 229 (1923)
(void against public policy enunciated in a statute); American Natl Bank v. A.G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923); Pacific Receptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Idaho
15, 248 P. 44 (1926); Industrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 SAV.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1938).
29. In 1950 the total consumer installment credit of commercial banks and finance
companies totaled over $11.1 billion but by July 1971 the total had risen to over $74.4
billion. 57 FED. REsERVE BULL. A56 (1971).

30. W. PHmLPS, TiE

ROLE OF THE SALES FINANCE COMPANIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

47 (1952).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/6

4

Hull: Consumer
Protection:
A Misallocation
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW

of Protection
[V1ol. XXV

These functions are essential to retailers for several reasons: (1) most retailers
are financially unable to carry the consumer's retail paper for long periods of
time; 31 (2) the seller is primarily a merchandiser and not in the business of
investigating credit and collecting time payments;3 2 and (3) by financing his
inventory through a financial institution rather than investing his own capital
the seller can realize a larger profit.33 Since the financial institution discounts
the consumer paper at a rate that will provide it with a fair profit, s 4 both

the seller and the financial institution are pleased with the arrangement and
have a mutual interest in increasing sales to consumers. The utility of this
relationship to the holder in due course doctrine and waiver of defense clauses
is readily apparent. If the financial institution will be protected by either
device it will be more willing to finance the notes given to the seller by
the consumer.
The rights of third party creditors were originally premised on ideas of
single, isolated installment sales involving wholly independent sellers and
financial institutions and on the idea of the finance company being unaware
of the underlying transaction from which the obligation to pay arose.35
Clearly this is not the case in modern consumer credit financing, since the
seller and financial institution have common interests in increasing con6
sumer sales and continuing their business relationship.3
Similar to other booming industries, the consumer credit industry has
attracted many unscrupulous businessmen. These are the individuals who
have misused the holder in due course doctrine and waiver of defense
clauses, 37 the original purposes of which were to facilitate transferability of commercial paper. When dealing with unscrupulous sellers,38 the
relatively naive consumer is at a distinct disadvantage. Fraudulently induced
to purchase faulty merchandise on a "referral plan,"3 9 the consumer finds
himself having to pay the purchase price to a financial institution, which
has purchased the consumer paper from the unscrupulous seller. The financial

31.
32.
33.

W. PHELPS, INSTALLMENT SALES FINANCING

34.

W.

-

ITS SERVICES TO THE DEALER

17 (1954).

Id.
Id.
PHELPS, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING AS A METHOD OF BUSINESS

FINANCE

38 (1957).
35. See generally Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM .
L. REV. 387 (1968); Laitos, Judicial Limitations on Holder in Due Course Claims, 42
U. COLO. L. REV. 439 (1971).
36. E.g., Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967)
(over 500 similar transactions between dealer and financer).
37. See Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
38. If all sellers were honest men there would be no problem. Ideally, all merchandise
sold would be of the quality truthfully represented to the buyer, and if it were not the
seller would remedy the matter in some fair manner. If such were the case there would
be no need for concern to save the customer's defenses.
39. American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). The

seller in this case made a home solicitation sale of a faulty water softener on a "referral
plan" the night before a holiday after "hard selling" the defendant for two hours. See
note 92 infra for a discussion of "referral plans."
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institution may be a completely innocent party that is in the business of
purchasing consumer paper and quite reasonably expects to be paid. The
financing party may see no reason why it should be concerned with the
underlying transaction between the unscrupulous seller and the consumerbuyer. As long as the law applied indiscriminately to consumer credit transactions as well as to business transactions, is preoccupied with the policy
of free transferability of commercial paper,40 the financial institution need
not be concerned with the consumer's plight.
It is therefore necessary to determine whether society should allocate the
risk of loss caused by a dishonest seller to the relatively naive consumer-buyer
or the financial institution that stands to profit by increased consumer sales.
The interest of the business community in free transferability of commercial
paper conflicts with the consumer's need for his normal remedy of withholding
payment if, for example, there has been failure of consideration.4' A rational
solution to this conflict is simply to apply one set of legal standards to
business transactions and a separate set to consumer credit transactions:
Several justifications exist for assigning the risk of loss in consumer credit
transactions to an innocent43 third party financial institution. 44 The principal
justification stems from the nature and relation of the parties involved. Consumers, especially those in a low socio-economic class, are unfamiliar with
the world of commercial credit transactions.4 5 Such a consumer may have
little comprehension of the legal consequences resulting from his signing a
promissory note or conditional sales contract containing a waiver clause. The
law should not ignore that the consumer-buyer is less sophisticated than the
businessman engaging in a credit transaction.
The naive nature of the consumer-buyer alone is not sufficient justification
for assigning the risk of loss to an innocent financial institution. Because
46
both the seller and financial institution are interested in increased sales, it

does not seem unreasonable to have the financial institution bear the risk

40. This note concerns itself solely with consumer credit, and it is in this area only
that it is urged that the policy of free transferability of consumer paper is inappropriate.
41. Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969).
42. This would call for the retention of the holder in due course doctrine in business
transactions, but its abolition along with waiver of defense clauses in consumer credit
transactions.
43. "Innocent" is used here because the majority of finance companies are, no doubt,
honest businessmen unaware of any defense the consumer may have against the seller. If
the financial institution is unscrupulous like the seller, no justification is necessary for
placing the risk of loss on him.
44. At common law the risk of loss was placed in the maker of a promissory note because, as between two innocent parties, the one who undertook the obligation upon which
the other relied should bear the risk. Cf. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. RaV.

205, 220 (1933).
45. "It is likewise impossible to assume he knew or understood that he agreed not to
set up any claims, defenses, counterclaims, setoffs or cross complaints in any action brought
by the assignee of the contract." Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138,
141, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969).
46. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
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of loss as a cost of doing business. 47 The financial institution is not only in a
better financial position to bear the loss than is the consumer,4 8 but it is
also more capable than the consumer of investigating the business practices
of the seller. 49 Moreover, the financial institution may protect itself and
shift the risk to the seller through the use of several contractual devices such
as recourse endorsements, 50 repurchase agreements, 51 warranties, 52 and reserve
plans.5 3 Essentially, these arrangements would shift the risk to the seller if
the consumer withheld payment for a legitimate reason.
Admittedly, the financial institution may still have to bear the loss in
cases where the seller is insolvent or has absconded. Realizing this possibility,
the finance company will be more reluctant to purchase consumer paper
from sellers it finds54 are unscrupulous or "fly-by-night."
The objections to placing the risk of loss on the financial institution are
principally economic and limited to circumstances where the finance company will bear a direct loss because the seller is insolvent or absconds. It is
argued that depriving the financial institution of its protected legal status
will cause a restriction in the supply of consumer credit. 55 This restriction

47. Compare 75 HARv. L. REv. 434, 437 (1961), with Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 840, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). The court found that the
success of the financial institution's transactions with the seller depended on the ability of
the seller to induce individuals to buy homes financed by the financial institution.
48. This has been recognized judicially in the oft-quoted case of Mutual Fin. Co. v.
Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
49. This was recognized in the relatively early case of Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De
Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (Buffalo City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6
N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
50. A recourse endorsement may either be full or qualified. If the recourse endorsement is full, the seller will be liable for the unpaid balance if the buyer defaults on
payment. If the recourse endorsement is qualified, he has no liabilities except statutory
warranties made by a qualified endorsement. See Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing
the Risk for Defective Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 782, 791 (1954).
51. If the endorsement is without recourse, it is often accompanied by a repurchase
agreement under the terms of which the seller may agree to pay the balance unpaid by
the buyer when the financial institution presents the seller with the repossessed merchandise. See id. at 792.
52. The seller may sign a standard contract by which he unconditionally warrants to
the financial institution his title to merchandise he sells, validity of the paper he endorses
to the financial institution, delivery of the goods, and the absence of any claims or
setoffs against such contracts. Id.
53. Under a reserve plan the financial institution will credit the seller's account with
a fixed percentage of the finance charge. Against this reserve, the financial institution will
charge any losses suffered on delinquent payments and any liabilities incurred from the
seller's paper. This arrangement may be profitable for the seller because when the reserve exceeds a certain percentage of the payments receivable or there is little of the
seller's paper outstanding, the excess or total is paid to the seller. Id.
54. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market for
Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 761-62 (1968). But cf. Felix,
Experience with Dealer and Consumer Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
73 BANKING LJ. 229, 233 (1956); Comment, Consumer Protection - The Role of Cut-Off
Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. Ray. 505, 524-25 n.98.
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would result in increased costs to the consumer, since the seller presumably
passes the cost of the less advantageous discount rate to the buyer through
higher prices.5 Since this procedure would distribute the risk of loss across
society the result is not necessarily undesirable. Previously, the consumer bore
the risk of loss alone, but eliminating the protected status of financial institutions would distribute this risk.5 7 Although increased costs may make it
more difficult for economically disadvantaged consumers to purchase such
items as freezers, the increased cost of a functioning freezer can be more
easily borne than the lower cost of a defective freezer.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED To PROTEUT THE CONSUMER
IN CREDIT TRANSACTONS

When the consumer of the twentieth century ventured into the commercial world of credit transactions, his unprotected position as against third
party financial institutions had already been determined. The unwary consumer buying on installment credit could easily find himself without defenses to actions by financing parties to collect the unpaid balance on the
consumer's note5s or retail installment contract containing a waiver clause.59
Therefore, unless the facts were sufficient to preclude the financing party from
attaining a legally protected status, 60 the consumer was not allowed to assert
his defenses against the financing party.
With the increase of consumer credit, however, came judicial recognition
of the plight of the consumer in credit transactions. One court stated:61

56. See Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Process, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969). The results of a
survey on the effects of CONN. GEN. STAT. §§42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1968), eliminating
negotiability in home solicitation sales, indicates three results should be expected if the
financial institution is made subject to the consumer's defenses. First, the financial institution must bear additional costs, but may effectively pass them on. Second, sellers bear
many additional costs and some marginal sellers are seriously injured by these costs. Finally,
the consumer must bear some of the cost of protection that is afforded him. Id. at 655.
57. Id.
58. E.g., Poss v. Meader, 189 Mich. 323, 155 N.W. 425 (1915). The consumer gave
several promissory notes to an auto company in payment for a car. These were transferred
to the president of the company in consideration for cash advances to the company. In a
suit on the notes, plaintiff was found to be a holder in due course and defendant was not
allowed to assert failure of consideration as a defense. Id.
59. E.g., Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908 (1937).
In a suit on a contract containing a waiver clause, defendant was not allowed to assert
breach of implied warranty that a refrigerator was unsuitable for the use intended. The
court said the warranty, whether express or implied, was one by the seller and not by
the assignee. Id. See also Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 911 (1922)
(waiver clause in contract to sell a tractor to a consumer was held valid).
60. E.g., Taylor v. Atlas Sec. Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923). The court
found actual knowledge of fraud on the part of the financial institution and held it
subject to the claims of the consumer. Id.
61. Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 745, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 786 (Buffalo
City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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Should not the risk of the fraud and misrepresentation of the
salesman be the risk of the business, rather than the risk of the unwary
buyer? The finance company, being a defacto part of a great conditional
sale commercial machine, should be no more allowed to escape from
the effects of the misrepresentation of a salesman than the merchant
is himself. This rule imposes no great hardship on the finance company. Zeal is shown in investigating the credit of the buyer; let zeal
likewise be expended in investigating the good faith of the salesman.
Judicial treatment of the consumer has varied since the need to afford him
protection against third party financial institutions was recognized. Appreciation of the case law in this area requires an understanding of the judicial
attempt to reconcile the policy of free transferability of commercial paper
with the need to protect the consumer. In attempting to reconcile these two
policies, the courts have stretched and, in some instances, distorted the law.
JUDICIAL NON-APPLICATION OF THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
TO CONSUMER CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

The largest obstacle confronting a court sympathetic to the needs of the
consumer was the subjective good faith test for qualification as a holder in
due course under the UNIA. This obstacle could easily have been removed
in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),6 2 but the language

of the drafters called for an actual knowledge test of good faith. 63 Courts
that have protected the consumer when either the UNIA or the UCC were
applicable have used the language of good faith, but have disregarded the
statutory test of actual knowledge on the part of the consumer note holder.64
This result has been accomplished by the use of several different rationales
including principal-agency relationship between financial institution and
seller, financial institution as original party to the transaction, and close
connection between seller and financial institution.65
The principle-agency rationale- 6 is based upon the idea that the seller
62. Under the 1952 draft of the UCC the test of good faith was an objective test.
UCC §3-302 (1952 version) provided in part: "(1) A holder in due course is a holder who
takes the instrument (a) for value, and (b) in good faith including observance of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged,
and ....
." UCC §302, comment I (1952 version) provided in part: "These 'reasonable
commercial standards' language added here . . . merely makes explicit what long has been
implicit in case-law handling of the 'good faith' concept. A businessman engaging in a
commercial transaction is not entitled to claim the peculiar advantages which the law
accords to the good faith purchases . . . on a bare showing of 'honesty in fact' when his
actions fail to meet the generally accepted standards current in his business, trade or
profession. The cases so hold; this section so declares the law."
63. The language calling for "reasonable commercial standards" was omitted in later
drafts of the UCC showing an intent to adhere to a subjective standard of good faith.
64. For a discussion of case law in relation to the subjective good faith test see
Littlefield, supra note 22.
65. Variations of these rationales are applied and more than one rationale is employed in some cases.
66. International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965). See also
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is the agent of the financial institution and therefore the knowledge of the
seller may be imputed to the financial institution. 67 If the seller has not performed his obligations in the transaction underlying the note, the finance
company is considered to have knowledge of this fact and precluded from
becoming a holder in due course. 8 It is unclear what facts are sufficient to
support a finding of an agency relationship. Evidence of furnishing forms
to secure the consumer's signature on the note and credit applications may or
may not be sufficient. 69 A seller may become the agent of the financing party
7
by securing the consumer's signature on a delivery and installation certificate. 0
While the principal-agency rationale protects the consumer, it is both a legal
fiction and in blatant disregard of the legislative requirement of actual knowledge on the part of the financing institution.
A second rationale employed to deny protected legal status to the financial
institution is the original party theory. 71 If the financial institution is found
to be an original party to the sale it is precluded from the legally protected
status of holder in due course. 72 The reasoning of decisions employing this
rationale seems to be based on the financing party's familiarity with the
credit arrangements underlying the note in question.73 The result reached
under the original party rationale, 74 if employed,75 is protective of the con-

Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. City Ct.
1971); Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
67. A variation on this theory is that the finance company may be precluded from
holder in due course status if it is named on the note as seller's agent for purpose of collection of the purchase price. Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
68. International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965).
69. Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967) (did
not create an agency relationship). But cf. Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 72 N.J. Super. 575,
181 A.2d 809 (1962).
70. International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965) (the
consumer is oftentimes requested to sign a certificate evidencing proper performance of
the sales contract by the seller).
71. This could be referred to as standing in the shoes of the dealer. See CIT Corp. v.
Emmons, 197 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1940).
72. E.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (Albee
Dell Homes, Inc., seller, and Approved Bancredit Corp., finance company, were wholly
owned subsidiaries of Albee Homes, Inc., and 99% of Bancredit's business came from Dell and
other wholly owned sales agencies of Albee Homes); United Sec. Corp. v. Franklin, 180
A.2d 505 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1962) (there was an interlocking directorate between the seller
and the financial institution).
73. E.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971).
74. A variation of the original party rationale was applied in Davis v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950) (the court ruled that a conspiracy
between dealer and financial institution would preclude holder in due course status).
75. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
Plaintiff was a purchaser of consumer paper and made a credit check on a consumer before purchasing the paper. The court ruled that the plaintiff was a holder in due course
and not aware of defendant's defenses. The original-party rationale could easily have been
applied in this case. Id.
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sumer, but again ignores the statutory requirement of actual knowledge on
the part of the financial institution.76
A final rationale employed by the courts to avoid the harsh results dictated
by the holder in due course doctrine is the close connection theory. This
theory has achieved some degree of judicial acceptance and was perhaps best
7

stated in Unico v. Owen:7

It would seem to follow, therefore, that the more the holder knows
about the underlying transaction, and particularly the more he controls or participates or becomes involved in it, the less he fits the role
of a good faith purchaser for value: the closer his relationship to the
underlying agreement which is the source of the note, the less need
there is for giving him the tension-free rights considered necessary in
a fast moving, credit extending commercial world.
The close connection theory makes an exception to the holder in due
course doctrine where the financial institution has a close working relationship with the seller in a consumer credit transaction.-, This theory can be
highly advantageous to the consumer because it focuses on the relationship
of the seller and the financial institution, 9 relieving the consumer of the
burden of showing actual knowledge.8 0 Although the close connection theory
receives continued acceptance8 l as a judicial exception to the holder in due
course doctrine,8 2 it ignores the legislatively intended subjective test of good
faith.83
76. This rationale has been criticized as not distinguishing between financing a
transaction and participating as a party when in fact the courts are really attempting to
find for the consumer. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 U. So. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966).
77. 50 N.J. 101, 109-10, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967).
78. See Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
79. See Note, Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 611, 618 (1970).
80. See Taylor v. Atlas Sec. Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923). This early
case applying close connection rationale to a consumer transaction states: "[T]he facts ...
give rise to a strong inference that defendant had actual knowledge of the fraud ....
Perhaps none of the circumstances, detailed . . . would show this knowledge, but all
taken together they strongly suggest it . . . . these circumstances, together with the close
relationship existing between the parties . . . established knowledge on the part of the
defendant." Id. at 287, 249 S.W. at 748.
81. E.g., Gross v. Applegren, 171 Colo. 7, 467 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1970); Jones v. Approved
Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla.
1953); Kennard v. Reliance, Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (Md. App. 1970); Paulson v.
Kustom Enterprises, 483 P.2d 708 (Mont. 1971); Westfield Fin. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super.
575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d

886 (1968).
82. This theory was never meant to be applied to commercial credit transactions, but
in Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 140, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954), involving a
commercial credit transaction, the court felt obliged to criticize and distinguish the close
connection cases as inapplicable. But cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County
Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950) (the court applied close connection
rationale to deny the holder of a commercial note the legally protected status).
83. Under the UCC, §3-302, there is no distinction drawn between consumer trans-
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Even if accepted by the courts, 4 the dose connection theory and the other
rationales offer no satisfactory guide indicating when they should be employed. The dealer-financing party relationship may range from the financing
of one transaction to the dual ownership of the selling and financial institutions by a single individual s 5 or corporation.8 6 Between these extremes, however, exist a myriad of dealer-financing party relationships.
Courts have agreed that furnishing forms for credit transactions is insufficient to preclude the financial institution from becoming a holder in
due course,87 even when a continuous relationship exists involving the transfer
of large volumes of consumer paper.88 When accompanied by a credit check
on the consumer, however, this activity has been found sufficient to preclude
the financing party from the legally protected status.8 9 Increased activity by
the financing party in the transaction, such as supervising the execution of
the notes90 and requiring certificates of satisfaction 9l by the consumer, have
also been identified as reasons to deny holder in due course status. Of course,
the more actively the financial institution is involved in the transaction or the
more it is apparent that the financial institution knows about the seller's
unscrupulous business practices, the greater is the likelihood that the court
will deny the protected status.92

actions and other transactions. The drafters did draw a distinction, however, between
consumer transactions and other transactions in §9-203. See notes 93-95 and accompanying
text infra. This dearly indicates the intent of §3-302 is to apply the actual knowledge

test to consumer transactions as well as to other commercial transactions.
84. See notes 116-117 and accompanying text infra.
85. Toms v. Nugent, 12 So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 1943) (holder in due course denied).
86. Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969).
87. See Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962). See also
Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954). By implication
it would not hold forms sufficient to deprive a financer of holder in due course status in

a consumer credit transaction. See note 82 supra. See also Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank
v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
88. E.g., Mann v. Leasko, 179 Cal. App. 2d 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1960) (over $1

million worth of notes transferred); Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir.
620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967) (500-600 notes transferred); New Jersey Mortgage & Inv. Co. v.
Calvetti, 68 N.J. 18, 171 A.2d 321 (1961) (over 2,000 notes transferred).

89. E.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Kennard v. Reliance,
Inc., 264 A.2d 832 (Md. 1970). But cf. White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La.
440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
90. E.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. Ct. App. 1940).
91. E.g., International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965);
Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1953) (the Texas
court, denying the protected status to the financial institution, noted that the financial
institution had relied not on the note, but on the certificate of completion).
92. E.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (financial institution requested and received progress reports on construction of pre-cut home
bought by consumer). A recurring fraudulent sales practice is a variation of a "referral"
plan. In Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 55, 192 A.2d 115,
116 (1963), seller called on the consumer and outlined a "program for direct advertising."
If the consumer purchased a bookcase, the seller would pay the consumer $5 for each
letter he wrote to a friend requesting an appointment with the seller to explain the
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VALIDITY OF WAIVER OF DEFENSE CLAUSES IN CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Section 9-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code 93 upholds the validity
of waiver of defense clauses, subject "to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." 94 The position taken by the drafters of the UCC was one of neutrality on the question
of whether a consumer may waive his defenses by contractual clause. 95 Therefore, state judicial decisions and legislative acts govern the validity of waiver
clauses.
Waiver clauses present an effective means of protecting the financial institution from consumer defenses, and their employment has often been upheld by courts unsympathetic to the consumer's plight. In Lundstrom v. Radio
Corp. of America96 the consumer-buyer of a television set was held to have
effectively waived his defense of fraud 97 against the assignee of the conditional
sales contract. The court found that even though fifty per cent of the seller's
transactions were financed by the financial institution involved, the logic
of the close-connection cases was inapplicable and the waiver clause must be
sustained as being the contractual agreement of the parties. 98 While this logic
is defensible as applied to businessmen, 99 it seems manifestly unjust when
applied to consumer credit transactions. 0 0 Generally, courts show no qualms

details of a sound advertising program and $20 for each sale made to such person. The
consumer's friends were to have the same opportunity to profit that he had. Seller represented that the consumer would realize enough money to pay for the bookcase and
sufficient more to send his daughter to college. See also Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams,
244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1,
240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). But cf. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405
P.2d 339 (1965). Although this case involved the use of a waiver clause, the fact that the
financial institution was aware of the referral plan did not preclude the institution's
recovery.
93. UCC §9-206(1) provides in part: "Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer
or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may
have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment
for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of
a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
under the Article on Commercial Paper [article 3]."
94. UCC §9-109(1) provides: "Goods are consumer goods if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
95. UCC §9-206, comment 2, provides in part: "This Article takes no position on the
controversial question whether a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive defenses
by contractual clause or by execution of a negotiable note."
96. 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965).
97. The financial institution had knowledge of seller's fraudulent "referral" sales
plan. Id.
98. Accord, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956).
99. See Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Blane's Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 15, 239
N.Y.S.2d 758 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962).
100. See Jennings v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 442 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969). The
consumer-buyer of an automobile was denied the defense of failure of consideration. The
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in upholding the validity of waiver clauses in sales not involving consumer
goods.101 This raises the question of whether it is desirable to broaden the
definition of "consumer goods" under the UCC.102
Several rationales have been used by courts to avoid the effect of waiver
of defense clauses. One rationale employed is that a waiver clause is an
attempt to impart negotiability to a non-negotiable instrument103 Since
statutes provide what instruments are negotiable, an attempt to impart
negotiability to an otherwise non-negotiable instrument is contrary to the
policy of the statutes.10 4 Additionally, there is a "very strong public policy
of protecting conditional vendees against the imposition by conditional
vendors and installment houses" and therefore waiver clauses are invalid
10 5
in consumer transactions.
Courts deciding cases under UCC, section 9-206, have employed three
lines of reasoning to invalidate waiver clauses. First, in Star Credit Corp. v.
Molina'0 the court reasoned that, due to the inequality of bargaining power
of the parties to consumer credit transactions, good faith as required under
section 9-206 meant more that simply "honesty in fact." Although the court
did not define "good faith," it invalidated the waiver clause because of a
combination of facts that precluded a finding of good faith regardless of
definition used.10 7 A second rationale is that a public policy is articulated
in decisional law' 08 or statutory law' 09 establishing a different rule for de-

court ruled that UCO §9-206 upheld the validity of waiver clauses.
101. See Beam v. John Deere Co., 398 S.W.2d 218 (Ark. 1966) (involved the sale of a
tractor). The court said: "There is not and could not be, any contention or valid claim
that the machinery here involved constitutes consumer goods." Id. at 220. Root v. John Deere
Co., Inc., 413 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1967); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidenberg, 428 P.2d
33 (N.M. 1967) (the court did not pass on whether cleaning and drying units were consumer goods but upheld the waiver clause on grounds that public policy encourages
freedom of contract).
102. Compare the definition of "consumer goods" in note 94 supra, with the definition

of "consumer" in the

NATIONAL CONSUMER

ACr §1.301 (8) (First Final Draft 1970) (defines

a consumer as "a person other than an organization who seeks or acquires business equipment for use in his business, or real or personal property, services, money or credit for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes."
103. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
104. E.g., American Nat'1 Bank v. A.G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923);
Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Quality Fin. Co. v.
Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967).
105. Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 154, 148 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1958).
106. 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. City Ct. 1969).
107. Id. The contract involved bore a printed assignment form, was in fact assigned
with twenty-four hours, and the dealer took a 20% discount. All contracts were assigned
subject to approval of buyer's credit.
108. E.g., Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154
(1971); Toker v. Perl, 108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (1970). Both of these cases invalidated waiver of defense clauses, reasoning that Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967), had established a different rule of decision for consumer sales.
109. E.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnally, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1966).
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ciding consumer cases involving waiver clauses. Finally, predicated on the
lack of equal bargaining power between the parties to the transaction, UCC,
section 2-302110 allows courts to invalidate unconscionable clauses in contracts.
This section, construed in conjunction with UCC, section 9-206, to invalidate
waiver clauses,", shows an "intention to leave in the hands of the courts the
continued application of common law principles in deciding in consumer goods
cases whether such waiver clauses... are so one-sided to be contrary to public
policy."112
Decisional law may be sufficient to protect the consumer credit buyer
in some instances, but it is generally an inadequate resolution of the problem
of preserving the consumer's defenses. Whether a court allows the consumer
to assert his defenses is partly attributable to the lack of sufficient standards
determinative of whether the seller-financing party relationship warrants a
denial of legally protected status.1 3 It is argued that this lack of certainty
dictates a continuation of a decision-law approach in order to prevent the
risk of loss being imposed on an innocent financial institution."1 This view
ignores the fact that the financial institution may shift the risk of loss to the
1 5 Additionally, courts
seller through devices such as recourse arrangements.
may not rule in favor of the consumer because to do so would be to disregard
being the duty of the legislature and not the courts
statutory intent," 6 it
7
to change the law."1

110. UCC §2-302(1) provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
111. E.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1969). See also Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1972).
112. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Although the transaction involved in this case occurred before the effective date of the UCC in New Jersey, the
court indicated this reasoning would apply to cases arising under the UCC. Contra, Star
Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. City Ct. 1969). This
court, while invalidating the waiver clause on grounds of lack of good faith, rejected the
UCC §2-302 argument saying: "[W]e might regard these contracts as improvident; we cannot hold them unconscionable." Id. at 294, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
113. See notes 87-92 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Note, Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. Rav. 611, 615 (1970).
115. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
116. White Sys. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951). Referring to cases denying
holder in due course status to financial institutions, this court said: "The basis of those
decisions is a feeling by the judiciary that, by using the Negotiable Instruments Law as
a shield, the finance company is given an unfair advantage over the consumer buyer.
There is undoubtedly some justification for this view, but steps to equalize their positions
and regulate installment credit sales should be taken by the legislature, and not by this
court in view of the clear provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law." Id. at 450, 33
So. 2d at 230.
117. See First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 II. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965). The
Illinois court upheld the validity of a waiver clause in the sale of an automobile on the
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The courts should be relieved of the dilemmas confronting them in suits
by financial institutions against consumers. The state legislatures should
recognize the need of allowing the consumer to assert his defenses against
the financial institutions.
STATE LEGISLATION DESIGNED To PRESERVE THE CONSUMER'S DEFENSES
Consumer protection legislation regulating credit transactions has proliferated over the past several years." 58 Legislative responses to this problem
range from being totally inadequate 9 to being comprehensive and farreaching solutions. 20 The consumer must be afforded the opportunity to assert
his personal defenses against a financial institution to whom the consumer's
note has been negotiated or to whom the conditional sales contract has been
assigned. Simply abolishing the holder in due course doctrine in consumer
credit transactions would be inadequate if the financial institution were then
able to rely on a waiver of defense dause; while the converse would be
equally inadequate.
Some statutes prohibit the execution of any note by a buyer, the negotiation of which may cut off defenses that the buyer has against the seller.n
More protective statutes apply not only to promissory notes but also to other
evidences of indebtedness."2- Assignment or negotiation of such paper to

basis that it was in accord with prior Illinois decision law as expressed in Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (see note 98 and accompanying
text supra). Referring to UCC §9-206 the Husted court stated: "While this section provides that either the legislature or the courts may establish a different rule, we view this
as a legislative function, the exercise of will rather than judgment, and we are reluctant
to change the prior decisional law." First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227,
233, 205 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1965).
118. For an excellent discussion of the problems and pitfalls of consumer-protection
statutes regulating credit transactions, see Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to
Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REv. 409, 432-40 (1967).
119. Those states having no legislation preserving consumer defenses against third
party financers include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Missouri not
only has no statute protecting the consumer in credit transactions, but actually has a
statute allowing the seller to "require the buyer to execute and deliver a negotiable
promissory note to evidence the obligation created by the retail time contract." Mo. STAT.
ANN. §408.260 (1) (Supp. 1971).
120. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4342 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW ch. 41, art. 10,
§403 (McKinney 1962). CAL. CIV. CODE §1810.7 (West Supp. 1971) provides in part: "No
- . . account shall require or entail the execution of any note . . . which when separately
negotiated will cut off as to third parties any . . . defense, which the buyer may have
against the seller."
122. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §2455 (1970); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §63.14.020 (1966)
provides in part: "That any such promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness
executed by the buyer shall not, when assigned or negotiated, cut off as to third parties
any . . . defense which the buyer may have against the seller ....
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third parties will not cut off any defense the consumer may have. These
statutes amount to a prohibition against negotiable instruments in consumer credit transactions.
Many states require the words "consumer paper" or words of similar import
to be printed on the face of the paper to signify that a consumer may assert
his defenses against any holder. 1 23 Such statutes, however, vary significantly.
In some states1 24 these statutes apply only to promissory notes, while in others

they apply to notes, instruments, and other evidences of indebtedness. 12 5
Alaska, however, provides that notwithstanding the absence of the words
-consumer paper," the financing party is subject to the defenses of the consumer and no agreement to the contrary may limit the consumer's rights. 2
Adequate protection is not afforded by those statutes that are limited in
application to promissory notes. Additionally, complete protection of the consumer requires a legislative proscription of waiver of defense clauses. In several states statutes have been enacted that invalidate any provision in a retail
installment contract by which the buyer waives any defense against the assignee that he would have had against the seller.127
Statutes that postpone the financial institution's attaining the legally
protected status for a period of time have also been enacted and are referred
to as notice-type statutes. 128 They may be applicable either to negotiated
notes or assigned contracts. 12 9 Generally, these statutes allow the financial
institution to take the consumer's paper free of personal defenses if he first
notifies the consumer that he is holder or assignee of the consumer's paper
and requests the consumer to notify him of any defenses the consumer may
have.130 The period required for notice of defenses varies substantially among

123. ALASKA STAT. §45.50.541 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REv. LAWS §476-36 (1968); Idaho
Laws 1971, ch. 181, §10(1); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §147 (Supp. 1969) (any note shall
refer to the installment agreement out of which it arises and the holder of such paper
is subject to all defenses of the buyer); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, §12c (1968); Oregon
Laws 1971, ch. 744; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §6-27-6 (1969).
124. HAWAII REV. LAws §476-36 (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, §12c (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN.

§476-36 (1970).

125. ALASKA STAT. §45.50.541 (Supp. 1971); Idaho Laws 1971, ch. 181, §10(1); Oregon
Laws, 1971, ch. 744.
126. ALASKA STAT. §45.50.541 (b) (Supp. 1971). See also Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 744.
127. ALASKA STAT. §45.10.140 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE §1804.2 (West Supp. 1971); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 255, §25a (1968); Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 275, §2, at 449; NEv.
REv. STAT. §97.275 (1965); N.M. STAT. §50-16-5(o (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAWS
ch. 41, art. 10, §403(b) (McKinney Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §1401 (Supp. 1971).
128. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §44-145 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4312 (Supp.
1970); Idaho Laws 1971, ch. 181, §10(2); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §262D (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1971); MIcH. CosNP. LAWS ANN. §445.865(d) (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §1402
(Supp. 1971); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6.07 (1967).
129. ARIz. REv. STAT. §44-145 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4312 (Supp. 1970);
Idaho Laws 1971, ch. 181, §10(s); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §262D (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1971); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §445.865(d) (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §1402 (Supp.
1971); TEX. REy. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6.07 (1967).
130. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §44-145 (Supp. 1971), which provides in part: "The rights
of a holder or assignee . . .are subject to all defenses and set-offs of the debtor . . .if
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the different statutes. A long period, such as the ninety days required by
Arizona,' 3 ' is obviously more advantageous to the consumer than a short
period, such as the five-day provision of Illinois.132 With a shorter notice period
the consumer has less time to realize that he has a personal defense and to
take quick affirmative action required by the statute. 33 Notice statutes imply
that the financial institution will not be subject to those defenses that the
consumer may discover after the period allowed for notice.13 4 It is doubtful
that the average consumer understands how to give notice to the financial
institution, even if he understands that he may preserve his defenses by giving
such notice. 35
Since the objective of legislation in this area is to preserve the consumer's
defenses against financial institutions the notice-type statutes, being attempts
to compromise the policies of free transferability of commercial paper and
consumer protection, are unsatisfactory and should not be utilized.
Another statutory solution forbids the seller from taking any negotiable
instrument other than a check in a consumer credit sale. 38 This solution does
not prohibit the financial institution from becoming a holder in due course,
however, unless it has notice that the negotiable instrument was issued in
violation of the statute. The first holder of a consumer's note, however, should
know whether the note was issued in violation of the statute by knowing the
identity of the seller from whom he purchased the note. It would be more
desirable to have a provision that if a negotiable note is taken with or without
notice, contrary to the terms of the statute, a holder may not be a holder in
due course.
By adding a provision to UCC, section 8-302, defining a holder in due
course, Maine has achieved the result of preserving the consumer's defenses:'37
(5) When the sale of consumer goods of $50 or more is involved,
any assignee of any installment sales contract or instrument given
therewith shall not be deemed a holder in due course.
(5) (d) Any provision by which the maker agrees not to assert against
a seller or holder a claim or defense arising out of the sale of said connotice of such defense or setoff is given within ninety days after receipt of the goods or
services by the debtor .... For a period of ninety days after receipt of the goods or
services by the debtor, a holder or assignee is not a holder in due course."
131. Aiuz. Rav. STAT. §44-145 (Supp. 1971).
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §262D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
133. Jordan 9- Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUht. L. Ray. 387,

435 (1968).
134. Id.
135. It is questionable whether the usually unsophisticated consumer understands the
"Notice to Buyer" provision, which Illinois requires to be placed on every sales contract
in at least 10-point bold type: "NOTICE TO BUYER: You have the right to give the
assignee (or if no assignee is named, to give the seller) written notice of any defense or
right of action against the assignee." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §262D (Smith-Hurd

Supp. 1971).
136. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 275, J2, at 489; CCH CoNstIERm CREDIT
(1971).
137.

GUDE, Ala.

6007

Maine Laws 1971, ch. 474, at 682,
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sumer goods or agrees not to assert against an assignee such a claim
or defense shall be void.
This statute explicitly covers both the holder in due course doctrine and
waiver of defense clauses. Statutes like Maine's are desirable from the point
of offering complete protection to the consumer in credit transactions.
Many state statutes that allow the consumer to assert his defenses in a
suit by a financial institution also allow the consumer to assert whatever
claims he may have. 138 The liability of the financial institution for such claims,
however, is generally limited to the amount unpaid on the consumer's
paper.139 Recent New Jersey legislation, however, has significantly expanded
the financing party's potential liability. 140 The consumer will be allowed to
assert claims against the seller of the merchandise, or against the buyer of
the contract for the amount already paid, limited only by the price agreed
4
upon in the sales contract.' '
Legislative recognition of the need to afford the consumer the opportunity to assert his defenses against financial institutions has increased, but
the solutions are far from adequate in most states. California is one of the
few states affording adequate protection to the consumer 2 but the result
was not wholly attributable to legislation. A liberal judicial interpretation
of the legislation helped to develop a scheme of complete consumer protection. 14 3 Though the desired result was reached in California, an effective
legislative scheme would preclude any possible loss of the consumer's de-

fenses.

1 44

138. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §45.50.541 (c) (Supp. 1971) provides: "The assignee's liability
under this section may not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time the
claim or defense is asserted against the assignee."
139. Id.
140. N.J. Laws 1971, ch. 399, at 1692 provides in part: "[Alny subsequent holder of a
consumer note shall be subject to all claims and defenses of the retail buyer against the
retail seller arising out of the transaction but no such claim or defense may be asserted
against such holder in excess of the time sales price under the retail installment contract
for any sale ......
141. Id.
142. CAL. CIv. CODE §1810.7 (West Supp. 1971) prohibits the execution of a note by a
buyer that will, when negotiated, cut off as to third parties any right of action or defense
that the buyer may have against the seller. CAL. CIv. CODE §1804.2 (West Supp. 1971)
subjects the assignee of the seller's rights to all claims and defenses of the buyer against
the seller, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
143. Morgan v. Reason Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 3 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968).
The California court decided this case on the basis of prior decisional law as put forth
in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange Co. Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950)
(see text accompanying note 82 supra). The court intimated its belief, however, that CAL.
CIV. CODE §1804.2 (West Supp. 1971) (see note 142 supra) repealed the holder in due
course doctrine for consumer sales. Id. at 892 n.16, 447 P.2d at 646 n.16, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 406
n.16. See also Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d
964. 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). The court, construing CAL. CIV. CODE §§1804.2, 1810.9 (West
Supp. 1971), ruled that the legislature and case law had established a different rule for
consumer credit transaction and that waiver of defense clauses was void in consumer installment sales contracts.
144. E.g., Maine Laws 1971, ch. 474, at 682. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
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Two model acts that involve the regulation of consumer credit transactions
have already been promulgated. The first was drafted in 1968 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is known as the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).1 45 Feeling that the UCCC was in-

adequate protection, the National Consumer Law Center promulgated the
National Consumer Act (NCA).146 A comparison of these two acts indicates
that the UCCC was the product of compromising the interests of financial
institutions with the interests of the consumers, while the NCA was totally
committed to consumer protection. This distinction probably accounts for
the fact that the UCCC has been adopted in six states 47 and the NCA has
yet to be adopted by a single state legislature.
UCCC, section 2.403,148 and NCA, section 2.405,149 both have as their
purpose the avoidance of the doctrine of holder in due course. UCCC, section 2.403, prohibits a seller from taking a negotiable instrument other than
a check. The financial institution, however, may become a holder in due
course under UCC, section 3-302, if it receives a negotiable instrument
issued in violation of that section without notice of such violation. This
section has been criticized as again raising the question of whether actual
knowledge of the violation is necessary or whether an objective standard of
notice would be more appropriate.'50 The NCA, however, destroys the concept of negotiability entirely in consumer credit transactions by a general
prohibition of instruments payable "to order" or "to bearer."'15 It further
provides that notwithstanding a note's being payable "to holder" or "to
bearer," the holder takes subject to the consumer's claims and defenses. Thus,
under the NCA even a third or fourth holder of a consumer note could not

145. The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE [hereinafter cited as UCCC] was introduced
in both branches of the Florida State Legislature in 1972. (Fla. S. 1136, Fla. H.R. 3182).
Both bills died in their respective branches. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1972 REGULAR SESSION
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE.

146. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr iii (First Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as NCA].
147. Colorado Laws 1971, ch. 207, at 770; 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 4770 (1972)
(Indiana); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§70B-l-101 to 70B-9-103 (Supp. 1971); Wyoming Laws 1971, ch. 191, at 274.
148. UCCC §2.403 provides in part: "In a consumer credit sale . . . the seller . . .
may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation
of the buyer ....
A holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with
notice that it is issued in violation of this section."
149. NCA §2-405 provides in part: "(1) No merchant shall take or otherwise arrange
for the consumer to sign an instrument payable 'to order' or 'to bearer' as evidence of
the credit obligation of the consumer in a consumer credit transaction. (2) Any holder of
an instrument, contract or other writing evidencing an obligation of the consumer takes
it subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer up to the amount of the transaction
total arising out of the transaction whether or not it is payable 'to order' or 'to bearer.'"
150. See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New

U.C.C.C., 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272 (1969).
151. UCC §3-104(1) provides in part: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument
within this article must ...
(d) be payable to order or to bearer."
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claim the legally protected status of holder in due course. 15 - The NCA provision presents an effective shield against the holder in due course doctrine
and reflects legislative cognizance of the realities of the consumer credit
market. The financial institution can safely extend credit if it investigates
the business practices of the dealers from whom it purchases consumer paper
153
and deals only with those whom it considers reputable.
Treatment of waiver of defense clauses by the UCCC and the NCA further characterize the UCCC as a compromise and the NCA as totally protective of the consumer." 4 The UCCC provides an adopting legislature with
alternatives regarding such clauses.'5s Alternative A'15 provides that the
assignee of the seller is subject to the defenses of the consumer notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. That is not a strict prohibition
against the presence of waiver of defense clauses, however. It has been suggested that an outright prohibition of waiver clauses would be a more satisfactory provision, since their presence, though of no effect, would be a coercive
tool if used by an unscrupulous financial institution before a dispute reached
the litigation stage. 157 Whereas Alternative A generally gives the consumer
adequate protection, Alternative B 15s does not. Alternative B resembles the
notice-type statutes, which have been adopted in many states. 159 It provides
that a waiver of defense clause may be enforced by an assignee taking in
good faith who gives the consumer notice of assignment and does not receive written notice of the consumer's possible defenses within three months.
Alternative B is subject to the same criticisms as notice-statutes that many
consumers are unaware of the opportunity and means of giving notice of

152. But see UCCC §2.403 comment, which provides in part: "However, it is possible
that in rare cases second or third takers may not know of an instrument's consumer
origin; in this unusual situation the policy favoring negotiability is upheld in order not
to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments generally.
153. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
154. See notes 151-152 and accompanying text supra.
155. UCCG §2.404.
156. UCCC §2.404, Alternative A, provides in part: "With respect to a consumer
credit sale . . . an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims
and defenses of the buyer . . . against the seller . . . arising out of the sale
notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary .
157. See Littlefield, supra note 150, at 289.
158. UCCC §2.404, Alternative B, provides in part: "(1) [A]n agreement by the
buyer . . . not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale
• . . is enforceable only by an assignee not related to the seller . . . who acquires the
buyer's . . . contract in good faith and for value, who gives the buyer . . . notice of
the assignment . . . and who, within 3 months after the mailing of the notice of assignment, receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the buyer's . . . claim or
defense. This agreement is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which have
arisen before the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed . . . . (2) An assignee
does not acquire a . . . contract in good faith . . . if the assignee has knowledge or,
from his course of dealing with the seller . . . or his records, notice of substantial complaints by other buyers . . . of the seller's . . . failure or refusal to perform his contracts ......
159. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
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their defenses in order to preserve them.160 The section may be satisfactory
for those consumers who realize their rights, but not for those unaware of
the need for affirmative action to preserve their defenses. 61 Alternative B is
inadequate and undesirable consumer protection legislation.162
There is an important feature of Alternative B, however, which distinguishes it to some extent from the notice-statutes. Alternative B does not
apply to defenses of the consumer that do not arise and that he was unaware
of until after the three-month period had expired. This raises the unanswered
question of whether he must give notice of newly discovered defenses or lose
them by virtue of the waiver clause.
The NCA, section 2.406,163 treats waiver clauses in a manner similar to
UCCC, section 2.404, Alternative A. Again the criticism would be that a
prohibition of waiver clauses is more satisfactory than merely declaring their
effect to be unenforceable.16 4
Effective legislation nullifying both the holder in due course doctrine and
waiver clauses would not necessarily eliminate abusive practices by unscrupulous sellers working with unscrupulous financial institutions. By changing
the formalities of the sales transaction and having the consumer take a direct
loan from a financial institution and subsequently pay cash to the seller, the
unscrupulous financial institution may yet retain its protected status. This
effectively insulates the financial institution from the consumer's defenses.105
There is no reason to believe that unscrupulous sellers and financial institutions will not resort to direct lending to avoid the effects of statutes whose
object is to deny the financial institution a legally protected status.
In order to fully protect the consumer this contingency must also be
covered by legislation, but there are several considerations dictating that the
scope of such legislation be limited.66 A broad statute would have a crippling
effect on consumer loans. If the lender had no idea when to expect a debtor
to assert defenses he would become more reluctant to lend money for consumer purchases or would raise the interest rates to a prohibitive level. It

160. See notes 136-140 and accompanying text supra.
161. Littlefield, supra note 150, at 292.
162. Whereas only two states, Utah and Idaho, adopted Alternative A, three of the
remaining four states, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming adopted Alternative B. Colorado
adopted neither alternative, but reserved the section for future use. All states adopting
Alternative B shortened the period for notice. Indiana substituted 60 days for 3 months.
Oklahoma substituted 30 days for 3 months. Wyoming substituted 45 days for 3 months.
163. NCA §2A06 provides in part: "Notwithstanding any term or agreement to the
contrary, an assignee of the rights of the creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of
the consumer .

...

"

164. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
165. E.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969). Consumer sued for reformation of a conditional sales contract. Defendant, financial institution,
asserted as a defense that the contract was a financing agreement and therefore it was
not subject to the consumer's claim that the -purchase price far exceeded the value of
the freezer purchased. The court, finding the contract unconscionable, said that the contract sued upon was in fact a retail installment contract and not a financing agreement.
166. For a discussion see Littlefield, supra note 150, at 292-97.
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would seem, therefore, that the legislation should apply only when the
lender knows the use to which the loan is to be applied. Moreover, there
must be such a connection between the loan and the sale that it may be
said that the formalities of two transactions instead of one were used
solely for the purpose of insulating the financial institution from the possible
16 7
defenses of the consumer.
NCA, section 2.407,168 makes the creditor in consumer loan transactions
subject to all defenses of the consumer "if the creditor participated in or was
connected with" the consumer sale transaction. This is an attempt to codify the
close-connection theory used to deny a financial institution holder in due
0
course status, 1 69 and apply it to the seller-lender relationship.17 This is
desirable for it gives the courts the flexibility necessary to balance the interests of consumer protection against the continued availability of consumer credit. By covering the possibility of direct loans by unscrupulous
salesmen and financial institutions, the NCA offers the most complete protection to the consumer.
CONCLUSION

The consumer may be the victim of a fraudulent sale or may simply receive faulty merchandise, but under the common law and the UCG he
would nevertheless be forced to pay the purchase price to a financial institution that bought his consumer paper from the seller. The holder in due
course doctrine and waiver of defense clauses have their proper application
in the business community, not in consumer credit transactions. The policy
of free tranferability of commercial paper is obsolete with respect to the realities of the consumer credit transaction. There should be a reassignment of
the risk of loss in the case of the seller's disappearance or insolvency, from
the consumer to the financial institution.
167. Id. at 295.
168. NCA §2.407 provides: " (1) The creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be
subject to all of the claims and defenses of the consumer up to the total amount financed,
arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used, if
the creditor participated in or was connected with the consumer sale or lease transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the creditor participates in or is connected with a consumer sale lease transaction when: (a) the creditor is a person related
to the seller or lessor; or (b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in connection
with the loan; or (c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor used by the consumer in obtaining the loan; or (d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar
year, the proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller, or lessor, or
with a person related to the same seller or lessor, or (e) the consumer is referred to the
creditor by the seller or lessor, or (f) the creditor, directly or indirectly pays the seller
or lessor any consideration whether or not it is in connection with the particular transaction; or (g) the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the
consumer in the consumer sale of lease as a result of a prior agreement between the
issuer and the seller or lessor." NCA §2.407 was enacted with minor changes as MAss.
ANN. LAws

ch. 255, §12F (Supp. 1970).

169. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
170. NCA §2.407, comment (a).
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This need for change was first recognized by the courts. The effects
of the holder in due course doctrine were avoided by the use of several
rationales, including principal-agent, original party, and dose-connection
theory. Waiver of defense dauses was held invalid for several reasons, but
generally referred to as void against public policy. Judicial protection of the
consumer's defenses is generally inadequate, however, because it has not
received approval in all jurisdictions nor achieved uniformity of result.
Legislation in those states that have addressed this problem may be
classified as prohibiting negotiability of notes, invalidating waiver of defense clauses, and deferring the legally protected status of the financial institution. To fully protect the consumer when the seller transfers the paper to a
financial institution, however, it is essential that the statutes cover the
difficulties arising under both the holder in due course doctrine and under
waiver clauses.
Uniform acts have been promulgated, attempting to focus on protection
of the consumer in credit transactions. The UCCC is a product of compromise and affords less protection to the consumer than the NCA. The NCA
includes a direct loan provision and offers the most complete protection to
the consumer. With the exception of section 2.406, which needs modification
to include a prohibition of the insertion of waiver clauses in retail installment contracts, 7 1 the NCA provisions should be adopted without modification by every legislature desiring to protect the consumer-buyer engaging in
credit transactions.
HENRY

H. HuLL

171. See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
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